Provenance from tools/call — receipts, not screenshots

Chat logs are not an audit trail. They are literature.

When an MCP client fires tools/call against HUMΛN, the interesting artifact is not the model’s narration — it is the receipt: which principal, which delegation, which tool, which outcome, chained into provenance the org can query later.

The hook: “the agent sent it”

Support asks why a customer got an email. Someone pastes a Cursor transcript. Legal asks for the decision record. The transcript has vibes. The ledger has — or should have — attribution.

What “provenance from tools/call” means

On the org mesh and Companion paths, execution rides HumanOS: delegation checks, risk gates, and provenance emission. Observatory / CLI evidence surfaces exist so operators can inspect runs without spelunking Redis.

You should be able to answer:

Who — Passport / org / agent DIDs on the grant
What — tool name + parameters (redacted per policy)
Under which rules — scopes and policy packs that allowed it
What happened — success, denial, escalation

If any of those are missing, you do not have MCP-as-colleague — you have MCP-as-rumor.

So that attributable agents beat anonymous automation

HUMΛN’s category claim is the trust layer between people and AI. Trust without receipts is branding. MCP is where agents actually act; provenance is how those acts remain contestable.

Scroll-stopper: If you cannot name the delegation on a tools/call, you do not have governance — you have a ghost with API keys.

Pair with field notes

For the human-readable shape of a receipt, read What a decision receipt looks like. This essay is the MCP-shaped version of the same demand.

Go deeper

Product: HumanOS, Governance
Docs: MCP integration
Community: Decision receipts, Passport/delegation, Org mesh